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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., TO BE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON THE

NOMINATION OF

ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., U.S. NAVY, TO BE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

JULY 30, 1985

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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., TO BE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TUESDAY, JULY 30, 1985

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Denton, Gramm, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Dixon, and Glenn.

Staff present: Patrick A. Tucker, counsel, Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority, Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel, Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk, Robert F. Bott, Douglas R. Graham, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Russel E. Milnes, Mark B. Robinson, and Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, Judith A. Freeman, Russell C. Miller, and Patricia L. Watson, research assistants; Marie Chaillet, Marie F. Dickinson, Karen A. Love, and Inga B. Schoonover, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; James H. Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; James B. Steinberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Phillip P. Upschulte, assistant to Senator Glenn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; and John Keeley, assistant to Senator Levin.

[The nomination reference and biographical sketch of Admiral Crowe follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
July 10, 1985.

Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., United States Navy, under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, Section 142, to be Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of Section 601.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., is the twelfth naval officer to hold the position of Commander in Chief Pacific. As the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, he heads the largest of the unified commands and directs Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force operations across more than 100 million square miles—over 50 percent of the earth's surface. The Pacific Command extends from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Africa, from the Arctic to the Antarctic. He is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is the U.S. military representative for collective defense arrangements in the Pacific. These include the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; the Mutual Defense Treaties with the Republic of Korea and the Republic of the Philippines; the ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; and the U.S./Thailand defense relationship under the multi-national Manila Pact.

Born on January 2, 1925, Admiral Crowe grew up in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, attending Classen High School and the University of Oklahoma for one year. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1946 with the Class of 1947. His further academic achievements include a Master of Arts in Personnel Administration from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton.

After receiving his commission, he served on U.S.S. *Carmick* (DMS-33). In June 1948, he entered the Naval Submarine School, New London, Connecticut. He qualified in submarines on 31 March 1950 in the submarine U.S.S. *Flying Fish* (SS-29). Following this tour, he served as Flag Lieutenant and Aide to the Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. He was assigned to the submarine U.S.S. *Clamagore* (SS-343) from 1952-1954 and as Assistant to the Naval Aide to the President of the United States from 1954-1955. He served as Executive Officer of the submarine U.S.S. *Wahoo* (SS-565) in Honolulu, Hawaii, and Commanding Officer of the submarine U.S.S. *Trout* (SS-566) in Charleston, South Carolina, prior to assignment as Commander, Submarine Division Thirty-One in San Diego, California.

Significant shore assignments, prior to attaining Flag rank, include: Aide to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy); Director of East Asia and Pacific Branch, Politico-Military Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Senior U.S. adviser to the Vietnamese Riverine Force, Republic of Vietnam; and Director of the Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Department of the Interior.

After promotion to Rear Admiral in June 1974, he reported as Deputy Director Strategic Plans, Policy, Nuclear Systems and National Security Affairs Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. From January 1975 to June 1976, he served as Director, East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). On 30 June 1976, he assumed duties as Commander, Middle East Force, a command based in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, which he held until July 1977. In August 1977, as a Vice Admiral, he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations), as well as Senior U.S. Military Representative to the United Nations. Admiral Crowe's promotion to Admiral was approved by the Senate on 28 March 1980. He became the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe on 30 May 1980. He assumed the additional responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe on 1 January 1983.

Admiral Crowe is married to the former Shirley Grennell of Okeene, Oklahoma. They have three children: Blake, Brent and Bambi. Their son, Blake, is a lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. The meeting will come to order.

The committee meets this morning to consider the nomination of Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is indeed an important hearing, in that Admiral Crowe had been nominated by the President to serve in the senior military position in our country.

We congratulate Admiral Crowe on the honor that has been bestowed on him by virtue of his selection by the President for this important responsibility. It goes without saying that Admiral Crowe is eminently qualified for this assignment. He has most re-

cently served as commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Unified Command for the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Far East.

Admiral Crowe has also served, in a naval career spanning almost 40 years, as commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe; Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations); commander of the Middle East Force; and Director of the East Asia and Pacific Region in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Earlier in his naval career he had numerous operational assignments.

Admiral Crowe is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He holds a master's degree in personnel administration from Stanford and a doctorate in politics from Princeton.

Admiral Crowe is a highly decorated naval officer, having won the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, and numerous other awards and foreign decorations.

Admiral, we are happy to have you here this morning, particularly because you have just come from the Pacific.

I sincerely hope that in your very responsible position you are able to convince some people in this town that the whole future of this country is in the perimeter of the Pacific. We ought to forget some of the other countries that we are worrying about and put more emphasis out there in the Pacific where the whole future of the economics of the world, in my opinion, rests, where we need to depend more than ever on our allies out there and be very careful whom we get in bed with in trying to do it.

I would like to recognize Senator Nunn as soon as he arrives.

We will have Admiral Crowe introduced now by the Senators from his own State of Oklahoma, Senator Boren and Senator Nickles.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID L. BOREN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Senator BOREN. Thank you very much.

It is a pleasure for Senator Nickles and I to be able to introduce Admiral Crowe. He needs no introduction to the committee.

You have ably summarized his qualifications for the position of Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are proud of him and happy for his appointment not only as an American, but for the qualifications he brings to the job and his ability.

We are especially proud in Oklahoma to see one of our own appointed by the President as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He was actually born in Kentucky, but at the age of 5 remedied that error by moving with his family to Oklahoma.

He graduated from Classen High School in Oklahoma City and attended the University of Oklahoma for 1 year before he went on to the Naval Academy.

As you have said, Mr. Chairman, he had a distinguished academic career before he began his outstanding military career, with a masters in personnel administration from Stanford and also a doctorate from Princeton in politics.

He has members of his family with him today. I would like to take the privilege of introducing them as well. Behind him we have his wife, Shirley, from Okeene, OK, originally. We are very happy to have her.

His son, Brent, and also his son, Blake, who is a first lieutenant in the Marine Corps.

Let me say we have almost another member of the family, also, of course, a lieutenant in the Marine Corps, Lynn Lunt, whom Blake will be marrying this Saturday. So, this will be quite a ceremony, Marine all the way. We are very, very proud to have them here.

Let me say in researching the admiral's record, I find only one deficiency. Shirley, as I mentioned, is from Okeene, OK, which in our State is known mainly for hosting the famous rattlesnake hunt.

I have had my staff look over the record. Of course, we have come across Admiral Crowe's service as a commander, Middle East Forces and Southern Europe, as you mentioned, and commander of the Naval Forces in Europe and commander of the U.S. Pacific Command; his record in submarines early in his career and distinguished record in Vietnam, but we can find no evidence that the Admiral ever did participate in the Okeene rattlesnake hunt. We are concerned about that, but we understand his son has and he explained to me the Marines can take care of the situation.

Seriously, we are very proud of him. We have known about him in Oklahoma for a long time. We have followed his career with great interest. He has been recognized as a member of the Oklahoma Hall of Fame. He is one of the most distinguished citizens of our State.

He brings to this post not only a great understanding of military affairs, but I think a very broad understanding of world affairs as well.

As you said, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important that we have as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a person who has a broad understanding of what is going on in the world, an understanding of geopolitics as well as the need for military preparedness and military capability of carrying out what is in the interests of this country.

I just say with great pride as an Oklahoman and with great confidence as an American, I take this opportunity to join with Senator Nickles in introducing Admiral Crowe.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, Senator Boren.

I don't think any rattlesnake would ever bother a Navy man.

Senator Nickles?

STATEMENT OF HON. DON NICKLES, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Senator NICKLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure for me to join with my senior colleague, Senator Boren, and this committee in highly recommending Admiral Crowe for this very important prestigious position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It is an enormous position, one with enormous responsibilities.

Admiral Crowe, I have the utmost confidence you can handle the job in a very fine fashion. Your academic credentials are almost unequaled anywhere. Your tours of duty and your many years of service in the military, both in Asia and particularly in the Pacific, are credentials that again are not equaled and are most important, I think, in the position you will be holding.

I am very confident you will work well with Congress and with the administration. I look forward to working with you as I am sure my colleagues do in the years ahead.

[The prepared statement of Senator Nickles follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DON NICKLES

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to sponsor an Oklahoman as President Reagan's nominee for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William James Crowe, Jr. He is a professional officer and a man of honor who has already received a significant amount of bipartisan support. A graduate of Classen High School in Oklahoma City, he and his lovely wife, the former Shirley Mary Grennell, list OKeene, Oklahoma as their permanent domicile.

Admiral Crowe is highly educated and possesses an understanding of the political complexities of our modern world. His formal education includes study at the University of Oklahoma, a B.S. from the U.S. Naval Academy, an M.A. in personnel management from Stanford University, an M.A. from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in political science from Princeton University. He is also a German and French linguist. Admiral Crowe's knowledge of world affairs is the result of a wide range of international assignments as well as his impressive scholastic achievements.

Admiral Crowe has served our Nation in the office of the Secretary of Defense as the Director of East Asia and the Pacific Region, as commander of the Middle East Force, as the Senior Navy member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, as commander in chief of allied forces in southern Europe and is currently serving as commander in chief of the Pacific.

Mr. Chairman, there is no individual more qualified to be our next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than William Crowe. He is the ideal example of a professional military officer. He has consistently put his loyalty to the Nation above parochial interest and has worked well with the other branches of our Nation's Armed Forces.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly endorse President Reagan's nomination of Admiral Crowe as our next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is extremely well qualified and would serve our Nation superbly in this highly important role.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I will skip the introductory part of my statement because our friends from Oklahoma have already done an admirable job of giving the background of Admiral Crowe. Let me add a few comments.

Admiral Crowe serves in two areas of growing importance to the United States, the Middle East and the Pacific. The job he has had in these areas has required him to understand the complex difficulties of the issues and the U.S. role in these regions. These experiences will serve him well and serve our Nation well in his important new job.

It is also important, I think very important, with the committee now undertaking reorganization as our top priority for the remainder of this year and whatever time is required next year, that we have a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that has served in many joint positions.

It is absolutely critical that our military forces in the 1980's and 1990's and the years ahead be able to operate jointly and in combined forces with our allies. Admiral Crowe has had extensive experience in joint and combined operations and that will bring to his new position a strong voice for these important aspects of our national defense. I think he is the right man in the right place at the right time.

Mr. Chairman, as you and I both know, the last few years have been bountiful ones for the Department of Defense in terms of resources going in. The American public and the Congress have responded to the awareness starting in the late 1970's that our military posture has slipped and the Soviets have embarked on and been undertaking for several years a massive military buildup.

There was widespread support in the late seventies and early eighties for increased military spending. However, I think we can all witness that that consensus has now eroded. If it is not completely eroded, it has certainly been in the process of eroding. There are a number of reasons for that erosion, but the point is that real growth in the range of 3 to 5 percent is not likely to be continued.

However, we have begun a large number of projects for which the initial cost is low, but the long-run cost is high. This will put an even tighter squeeze on future defense budgets and present great challenges to Admiral Crowe and his colleagues in the Department of Defense.

The next several years are going to have to concentrate on output. I think the last several have concentrated on input. You really have to have both, as a matter of fact, but I think management and the marshaling or our resources in a coherent way and the cooperation between our services and particularly the cooperation between our country and our allies have never been more important.

We are going to have to figure ways to make our defense dollar buy more in terms of military capability.

I would say another question that we have is what I call the strategy force mismatch. We have made many strategic commitments to many parts of the world and to many of our allies. We have defined our interests very widely.

I understand why we have done so and I agree with the number of the commitments we have made, but I do not understand how we are going to be able to meet the demands which will be made upon us if all of these commitments become due and I think we are going to have to have a much more skillful use of military strategy and military tactics in the future and that can only come from our military leadership, particularly the Joint Chiefs and particularly the Chairman.

Admiral Crowe, you said when we met the other day you are filling some very big shoes as you step in the position so ably held by General Vessey.

I know I speak for everyone on this committee when I say how highly we regarded and continue to regard General Vessey, his quiet professionalism and his dedication to the men and women of the armed services and the national security needs of the United States. He has made an enormous contribution to this Nation and

the free world. He will be missed. We wish General Vessey and Mrs. Vessey and his family well in his well-deserved retirement.

I enjoyed working very closely with the Joint Chiefs and, Admiral Crowe, I know we are going to continue to enjoy that relationship between this committee and the Joint Chiefs. We look forward to addressing these and many other problems and I certainly look forward to proudly supporting your nomination.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Senator.

I might say the armed services are the only ones that have balanced the budget.

Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with your remarks and add my welcome to Admiral Crowe.

Admiral, it is a pleasure to have you here today and I look forward to working with you in the future.

Admiral Crowe, I note that you have a very distinguished military record that began during World War II. You have served in positions of great repsonsibility in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in NATO, and as commander in chief of our Pacific Forces. You even served in Charleston, SC, as the commander of the submarine U.S.S. *Trout*, and that gave you a good start.

You have distinguished yourself not only in the military, but in the field of academics as well, earning your doctorate from Princeton.

Mr. Chairman, I have had an opportunity to visit with Admiral Crowe in Hawaii this year, and I can assure you that the President has made an outstanding choice. I was deeply impressed with what I saw and heard about him out there and I am sure he will make one of the finest Chairmen that the Joint Chiefs have ever had. I am sure he will provide frank, honest advice to the President and to the Congress.

Admiral, I wish you well. It is a pleasure to have you. I am sure that you will make a record that will be a credit to yourself and your family and your country.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I have a Judiciary hearing this morning. I will leave my proxy with you, Mr. Chairman, if I am not back.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. I have no statement. I welcome Admiral Crowe.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. I think we should get on with the record. I have known the Admiral a long time. He has my support.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Dixon?

Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to take part in this hearing on the confirmation of Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Crowe had had an outstanding naval career and his nomination by the President is an indication of his high level of professionalism. He would succeed General Vessey, who, I believe has done a superb job as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since Admiral Crowe's present assignment is as commander of a unified command, I look forward to hearing his views on military

management and on how he views his new responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

This committee, at the direction of the Chairman and ranking member, has been looking very closely at a reorganization of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Crowe's advice, I know, will be very important to our preparation of final recommendations.

I again congratulate Admiral Crowe and look forward to working with him in the future.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Admiral, do you have a statement you care to make?

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR., U.S. NAVY, NOMINATED TO BE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral CROWE. I do not have a formal statement, Mr. Chairman. I have a few comments I would like to make.

I would like to thank my Oklahoma Senators for their very kind remarks. They were very generous.

My minister said that the difference between a eulogy and a testimonial is in the case of the testimonial there is one man in the audience who believes it. [Laughter.]

They were most generous this morning.

I am most honored to be here today. It is not my first appearance before this body, but it is clearly my most significant. Certainly my career planning did not foresee such an appearance—not even in my most ambitious thoughts.

While the hearing today is for the purpose of my confirmation, I feel compelled to comment on the superb job which General Vessey has done, and is doing, as Chairman. He is a remarkable soldier and leader and a dedicated American who has earned the respect and gratitude not only of the military services, but of the entire Nation. I am privileged to be nominated to succeed him.

When I left home in Oklahoma to enter the Naval Academy more than 40 years ago, I was persuaded that no career could be more fulfilling than one devoted to the defense of the Republic, its people, its institutions and its ideas. I hold that belief even more firmly today.

I am, therefore, deeply honored by this nomination and expression of confidence by the President. Although humbled by the prospect, I believe I appreciate the heavy responsibilities involved and, if confirmed, am prepared to accept them without reservation.

Moreover, I welcome the opportunity to further serve our country and to remain associated with the superb soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who every day give so much of themselves on behalf of all of us.

Similarly, I look forward to working closely and candidly with the Congress, with this committee, and with the civilian and military leadership of the executive branch in securing the defense of the greatest Nation on Earth. In pursuit of that objective, I pledge to you my total energies and abilities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Admiral.

I might say at this point that the committee in keeping with the law, and with your cooperation, has investigated your financial situation. Everything is in order. This is for the record.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Admiral, a couple of questions about strategy.

You have been head of the Unified Command out in the Pacific. I know you have had to engage in an awful lot of contingency planning, and so forth.

Could you give us your views of how the Joint Chiefs and particularly the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will involve themselves in the formulation of military strategy and particularly how that relates to the commanders in chief out in the field?

In other words, the relationship between the Joint Chiefs and contingency planning, particularly strategic planning?

Admiral CROWE. Senator, I think in your preliminary remarks you laid the framework for some of the problems that confront a strategic planner.

We start out, of course, with national interests, translate those into objectives, political, economic, and military, in order to draw up the strategy. There is some confusion about the term strategy. It means different things to different people.

I would not imply that strategy only concerns the military. We also have political strategy, and we have economic strategy, to fulfill our interests. But certainly one of the important legs in strategy is the military.

I think the primary principle which concerns that strategy is that we have a policy to deter aggression, prevent coercion, protect ourselves from threat. This is buttressed by the use of forces when, and if necessary and if we can to influence international affairs, pursue a vigorous arms control policy, et cetera.

Below that, on the military level, the Joint Chiefs and the unified commanders flesh out this strategy with a host of plans over the entire range of contingencies. Now, the question which concerns you, and the one that I am most involved in as a Pacific commander, is our military strategy. There are three things that impact on that strategy.

First of all, our commitments. We are a global power with global interests. We have assumed the leadership of the free world. We have acquired over the years many, many commitments, most with bipartisan support.

I would concur with your statement; I do not think those commitments should be reduced. I have often heard people say the way to correct any problems we have is to reduce our commitments. When you ask what commitments should be reduced, the argument sort of trails off, people get very vague.

I would not suggest we reduce our commitments.

The second fact that impacts on strategy is, of course, the resources available. The more resources, the more flexibility and latitude we have.

As you said in your prognostication, you do not see a tremendous ramp up in the coming years.

The third way, of course, is to adjust our military strategy to fit within that framework, to fit the resources we have available.

I think there is confusion in this regard. People say we have a large number of commitments; therefore, we are going to have to do many things at the same time. We are going to have to meet, for example, our potential adversaries everywhere they are, man for man, weapon for weapon.

Our constraints on resources have not permitted us to do that for several years. I might read a statement from the 1984 military posture statement:

> U.S. forces are obviously not available to defend everywhere against every threat at all times. U.S. military strategy does not envision that approach.

If I could talk about my own command with which I am much more familiar, that is what my strategic planners do. We have a number of plans that are designed to deal with a wide range of contingencies.

However, if confronted with major hostilities, we would not execute all those plans simultaneously. We would have to make some very tough collective decisions as to which plans were most important. We would look for enemy vulnerabilities. We would look for our strengths and how we can best exploit those strengths. We would try to use our forces to meet the major threat.

I would not suggest our planning process is perfect, it is not, but we are improving. We are constantly reviewing and adjusting plans to changing situations. We welcome assistance and advice on how to improve the planning process.

I believe the JCS planning process is similar. I will be more familiar with it after I have had some time in the JCS.

We must always use our resources to the best effect and in conjunction with our allies get the most for the money. At the same time I have an open mind about improvement.

My father used to say, your mind is like a parachute; if it won't open when you need it, it is not much good. I have an open mind.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Admiral.

I have one other question on this first round, then I will come back.

As you know, Chairman Goldwater has established a committee task force to review the organization of the Department of Defense, including JCS and the Unified Commands.

Last year the conference committee adopted a series of questions they posed to both the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs and unified commanders out there in the field.

Your response was particularly helpful. In one of your answers you said, and I quote:

> To be more effective, the unified commander's authority in strategic and operational matters needs better and broader definition, i.e., to include more voice and include service for logistics and training decisions which affect his operational and strategic responsiblity.

I am not going to get into all your views on the Joint Chiefs. I am sure you will have more definitive views as time goes on on that and you have been in your position as Chairman.

But as far as the unified commanders, the people who actually are in charge with doing the fighting and planning out there in the field, what do you mean by saying you need more authority in terms of the unified commander?

Is that vis-a-vis the component command, vis-a-vis the service, vis-a-vis what?

Admiral CROWE. If I can compress my remarks, to begin with, I want more influence in the budgetary process. There have been a number of steps taken in the last 2 years to increase that influence. We are now a heavy participant in the POM process.

I attended the Defense Resources Board this week where one can see the results of the Unified Command participation. We are now in it from beginning to end. I think it is helpful. I applaud this improvement which has taken place within the context of the present law. I am not suggesting anything except changes in procedure.

It would also be helpful for the unified commander to have more direct contact with the service chiefs on logistics views, logistics decisions which are in their purview, that may impact on strategic decisions as well as training decisions. And also in the same regard, to go directly to the service chiefs instead of always working with the component commanders. I think this will enhance the unified commander's authority and make him more responsive.

Senator NUNN. You are saying the unified commander on many of those kinds of key questions, logistics and training, has to go through one of his subordinates in order to get to the resources in his services?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. So, it is the unity of command downward, in reverse rather than upward. You are really going through someone below you in order to get decisions made?

Admiral CROWE. I put him in the middle. He has to satisfy both me and the service people. I do not mean to imply the present system is not working. Every one of those commanders has grown up in it, knows how it works. I think it will be an improvement.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Admiral, I welcome the opportunity to resume our working relationship of many years ago when I was in the Department.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. In discussing the issue of reorganization with one of your predecessors, he told me in a very distinct way that if the chairman has the character, the intelligence, the command presence and the commitment, he can make that job work and work well, in the best interest of the country and the President, irrespective of all the laws. I happen to hold that opinion.

I wonder if you share that?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir, I share that. You have a living example of this in General Vessey. I think he has been a major contributor to the revival of spirit in the military. He has fashioned a reputation for integrity and common sense which is absolutely wonderful and he is respected throughout the military.

I would like to project a similar image.

Senator WARNER. We share that view with respect to General Vessey here in the Senate. I think you have the same attributes and will do an equally fine job.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Let us turn to a very difficult issue. It is one that has been debated within the administration recently, particularly between the Secretaries of Defense and State. You will be one of the principal advisers to the President on the use of force.

Under what conditions, Admiral, would you recommend to the President of the United States that force be employed, particularly in the area, gray area, of terrorism?

Admiral CROWE. Senator, that is a very difficult question and, of course, you have implied that by the words you used, the gray area. The situation is often fuzzy.

The facts are not clear. It is not always clear what the situation on the ground is, what pressures are being brought to bear and what influence your actions will have.

Where terrorism is concerned, I lived in Italy for 3 years under the threat of the Red Brigade, with the inconvenience, the heavy security, and finding my name on a number of hit lists.

It is a difficult problem to deal with. It takes patience and perseverance. It may not be wisest to thrash out and react the way your emotions may guide you.

I do not have any truck with terrorists. I know there are some terrorists who respect nothing but force. If that is indicated, all well and good. I cannot answer your question directly. I would have to know the circumstances in the specific case we are talking about.

Senator WARNER. It seems to me as I studied the differences, and there are some between the distinguished Secretaries of State and Defense, Mr. Weinberger has adopted the philosophy that if there is a clear causal chain between the event and the perpetrators of that event, then in that instance there may rest a case for the use of force.

But unless there is a causal chain, it would not be in the best interest of the country, nor has this country ever lashed out in a way characterized as an "eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."

Given that philosophy, where do you think these guidelines would fit?

Admiral CROWE. My general principle would be to try in the best manner available to determine whether the situation would be better off or worse off after we took action. If we were better off, the answer is obvious.

I know that Secretary Weinberger has spoken out on some guidelines that he feels have to do with the commitment of force. They have been accepted by some and criticized by others.

Senator WARNER. My question would be: Are you comfortable with those guidelines?

Admiral CROWE. I am comfortable with those guidelines. It is a difficult situation even with good guidelines. However, that does not invalidate the effort to try to clarify our thinking of approaching the problem or separating the wheat from the chaff.

That is what Secretary Weinberger is trying to do. I applaud his efforts.

Senator WARNER. Regarding the issue of strategy raised by Mr. Nunn and others—what appears to be force imbalance—do you feel that in view of the level of commitment, the level of resources, that there is an imbalance?

Admiral CROWE. As I said about the strategy planner, the more resources he has, the more latitude, the more things he can do simultaneously.

We are now using a strategy you might call sequential instead of simultaneous. In general hostilities we would not be able to do all the things we would like to do simultaneously. We have been in that situation for a number of years.

We work on the sequential principle, the more important things first.

Senator WARNER. Using the yardstick of major engagement and minor engagement, how many major engagements could we be involved in at one time, how many minor engagements, and in what theaters would we want to be?

In the old days the Army tried to lay down a formula.

Admiral CROWE. I am not sure I can subscribe to a hard and fast formula. I do subscribe to the proposition if we are in direct confrontation with the Soviets, our prospects of going global are very high.

That does not mean we would match the Soviets weapon for weapon, man for man, plane for plane. We do not intend to do that in my own region. If we had to fight the Soviets, we would do it in a thoughtful and rational way—we would consider where they are the weakest and where it will influence the outcome the most, we would do best by concentrating our forces, using our mobility, and using our strength selectively.

Senator WARNER. Let me turn to one last question.

Over your 40-year military career you have seen the growing importance of women in the Armed Forces. Recently a senior official in the Department of Defense in addressing a large audience of women who joined in Washington to advise the Secretary on policy direction is alleged to have said it is time for Congress to revisit the issue of permitting women to be trained and be assigned for roles in combat.

Have you formulated a view on that?

Admiral CROWE. First of all, Senator, I am not used to testifying with my wife in the room. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. You have a daughter-in-law.

Admiral CROWE. I have a prospective daughter-in-law who is in the service.

I like the situation where it is now.

Incidentally, I have not met female officers in the military who are that unhappy. Everywhere I go most of the female service members I meet are happy. They handle their responsibility very well.

Senator QUAYLE. This question is raised in connection with its being an impediment to reaching higher rank.

I share your view on the subject.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Exon?

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Admiral Crowe, let me welcome you here. I am delighted with your nomination by the President. I know you will make a fine and outstanding member as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

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I would say that I am also delighted with your nomination because my immediate predecessor questioning you, the former distinguished Secretary of the Navy, John Warner, reportedly was about ready to picket the White House unless a Navy man was selected as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

So, I know that the former Secretary of the Navy is delighted, as I am, with your appointment.

Admiral CROWE. I labor under the illusion, Senator, they picked me for my capabilities.

Senator EXON. No, it was because of Senator Warner. [Laughter.]

Admiral, let me get down to a few questions that have been uppermost in my mind, and I assume yours as the unified commander for the Pacific. I feel that the Pacific has been one of those areas that has been kind of a sleeping dog.

With the Soviet buildup in Cam Ranh Bay and other events, I believe that things potentially could heat up over the next few years out there.

Can you give us a political view of the present seeming difficulties of the Marcos government in the Philippines and whether or not a change in that Government will cause any disruption of our important naval and air facilities in the Philippines? If we would lose these bases for any reason, would it be a substantial blow to our position in the Pacific?

Admiral CROWE. Your assumptions are absolutely correct, Senator. I should make it clear at the outset these are not U.S. bases in any sense of the word. They are Philippine bases which we enjoy access to.

We make no secret of the fact that they are important to us. They are important to defend the Philippines. They are important to facilitate our forward deployment in the western Pacific. Frankly, they are important to the entire free world because peace and stability in that area to a large extent rest on our military presence.

Access to these facilities makes it easier and cheaper. Wherever I go throughout the western Pacific talking to military and civilian leaders they express concern over those facilities. They understand and express their views on the importance of our retaining access.

Obviously, we are very concerned about developments in the Philippines. It has been an unfortunate conjunction of events. Following on the Aquino assassination, there has been considerable erosion of political support for the Government, capital has fled from the Philippines exacerbating an already bad economic situation. President Marcos' health has been a factor.

The Communist Party of the Philippines has taken advantage of all these happenings. Their military arm, the NPA, the New People's Army, has been recruiting and playing on the maladministration in the rural districts, attracting more and more members. The NPA has become a very definite threat.

Simultaneously the economic problem has prevented the armed forces of the Philippines from keeping pace. They are probably in the worst situation they have been in many years to deal with an insurgency.

All of these things must be sorted out. The Government is fighting very hard to correct them. I don't know the future of the Phil-

ippines. We have a deep vested interest in this situation and we must follow it with great concern.

With regard to the access to our facilities, I don't know whether it is through our skill or luck, but that has not become a major political issue in the Philippines. Thus far, the Communist Party has not made that a major issue. They have not chosen to attack Americans. That could change at any time. We are concerned and we are closely monitoring the situation.

If there was a change in the Philippine Government in the immediate future, I do not see any viable elements in the opposition that would sever the connection with the United States. I say that because most of those people who are genuine politicians and are worried about the future of the Philippines understand that the United States is necessary to them and certainly any government that seriously wants to sort out economic problems needs United States support.

There are fringe elements that would do so and there are politicians who would use our presence to discredit the present administration. If there was a change, it would make our lives more miserable.

If the NPA continues to expand and is successful, that assessment could very well change in a few years. If they become a viable alternative and came into power, the Communists would certainly sever the current relationship.

Senator EXON. Admiral, thank you for your frank answer and assessment.

Admiral, do you agree that despite the defense buildup of the last few years, the balance of power remains largely unchanged and is continuing to grow in favor of the Soviets?

I am thinking militarily only, of course.

Admiral CROWE. I would prefer to answer more or less in terms of my own region as I am more familiar with that region.

Obviously, the Soviets have discovered the Pacific and since 1979 have been building their military precipitously. I attribute that in large part to the fact that the Soviets have not been successful either politically or economically in the Far East. As a matter of fact, they have been quite unsuccessful.

We do $180 billion worth of business a year with Japan compared to the Soviets $3 to $4 billion. Japan is one of the greatest economic miracles in the world and the Soviets cannot penetrate the market. They have not been remarkably successful. It is continuing to frustrate them.

They seem to expand in Communist fashion, with the only alternative they can do unilaterally, and that is to build up military strength. It is impressive. They have some of the most advanced weapon systems. Their buildup is continuous and persistent.

We, in turn, have not been standing still. That does not mean that I have a real warm and fuzzy feeling about the military balance. If you were to ask me today in the Pacific situation, I could not say that we would prevail, but as a result of the improvements that have been made in my situation, my readiness posture over the last 4 to 5 years, the Soviets cannot say they would prevail either.

Every indication of readiness, training, and preparedness that I have in my forces is on the up trend and has been now for several years. My forces are consistently and steadily improving.

I do not consider the balance deteriorating; in fact, it is improving in my region. We have a long ways to go. We do not have the sense of confidence that we should have.

Senator EXON. Admiral, my last question in the first round has to do with the relative strength of the conventional forces. You are going to be faced with this in the future, and recommending to the executive branch, and we are going to be asking questions here over the next few months and years about where we should put our resources.

We have finite resources to pledge to our nuclear deterrent strength on the one hand and conventional forces strength on the other.

What is your overview of the balance between resources committed to our nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis our conventional deterrent and what is your present attitude with regard to where the emphasis should be placed other than the normal answer that we need both?

Admiral CROWE. Not only do we need both, Senator, the question we have today is not whether we need them, but where the emphasis is put. I assume that is what you are concerned with.

Senator EXON. Exactly.

Admiral CROWE. Obviously, the strategic deterrent undergirds practically everything we do. I cannot hypothesize a confrontation scenario where we are in a position of nuclear inferiority that it would be to our advantage. I have seen that tested many times in war games.

So, strategic deterrence is extremely important. We have not put as much percentagewise or emphasiswise in the strategic deterrent as many people think we have. It has been a rather modest percentage of our total investment over the years.

A few years ago we were relying on 1950 and 1960 vintage equipment and we had allowed our strategic deterrence to sort of fall behind with no updating or modernization, this in the face of tremendous strategic weapon expansion by the Soviet Union.

We have redressed this to a certain extent. We have in turn a very appropriate program for modernizing our strategic forces. I would like to see that carried out. When it is carried out, there should be a reassessment on the amount we spend on strategic forces.

I support the programs that are currently ongoing. As soon as we can cut back on those, I think we should. The emphasis for some time now, the major emphasis, has been on conventional force. As an operational commander who deals with day-to-day problems and is worried about what we need to fight today, I strongly support modernization of our conventional systems—particularly sustainability improvements.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Crowe indicated before that he is a man of many hats. I was going to ask if you have managed to transport all of them back?

Admiral CROWE. I had planned to give them to the museum in Oklahoma, Senator, but there have been so many articles published about my hats, my wife tells me I must bring them to Washington.

Senator COHEN. You have been asked about everything except your opinion on the line item veto. I assume that once you are confirmed we will hear from you on that.

A couple of statements have been made here this morning, both on this side of the table, and one by the chairman, that the whole future lies in the perimeter of the Pacific. It is now called the Mansfield-Goldwater doctrine. We will have to read what the repercussion will be in NATO tomorrow.

The second statement made was that of Senator Nunn where he indicated that the consensus for defense spending has eroded. The fact of the matter is we are now fighting inflation in the defense budget.

It only points up what a difference less than a year can make. Less than a year ago Walter Mondale, former Vice President, campaigning for the Presidency, argued on behalf of a 3- to 5-percent increase in defense spending and 8 months later, 9 months later, it went down to zero or less

So, in politics it does not take long to drop from this commitment in defense spending to practically zero. I think that has been brought about for several reasons.

No. 1, there is a perception that the current system is not working. Certainly with respect to procurement, our procurement system is deficient and in some respects it is a disaster.

There is a question about the adequacy of crisis planning, contingency planning. There is another element involving inter-service competition that has yielded to consensus for action, but that consensus has come at the expense of competence and efficiency and, of course, the argument of *Mayaguez,* Desert One, to some degree even what took place during the rescue mission in Grenada. I think we are the last people to talk about logrolling.

We have just concluded a House-Senate conference. I don't think anybody on this side of the table could hold out as being above logrolling, but there is a genuine concern that too much logrolling has taken place with the Department itself when it comes to taking action in various parts of the world.

Senator Nunn has already mentioned this committee's determination to look at the possibility and, hopefully, probability of some major reorganizational effort to be undertaken, and I would feel confident with your support.

I think it will be necessary if, in fact, we are going to come back to reviving what all of us on this committee believes is imperative, and that is restoring a sense of competence that we are getting what we are paying for, that we are planning adequately, that we are in fact putting together the best possible force that we can without regard to interservice rivalry and competition, and so forth.

I would like to shift to an area of your expertise recently in the Pacific, your comments on New Zealand, any other countries in the region that have been New Zealandized, and then to Japan and Korea.

A lot of people have been concerned about some of my statements and those of members of this committee about whether or not we overreacted and really took advantage of New Zealand when they decided to bar your nuclear ships from going there.

I was wondering what your opinion is about the impact of the New Zealand decision, what it foretells in terms of its impact on other nations.

Does it have a potential for setting in motion a dynamic for unilateral steps for deneutralizing the region?

Then perhaps we will shift to Japan and the Philippines. With respect to Japan, there is a lot of sentiment to make Japan do more, spend more.

I would like your impressions and your opinion as to whether Japan should do more in defense of itself and the region and how far it can go politically and militarily.

Admiral CROWE. As you know, you and I discussed New Zealand. I am in accord with what we are doing vis-a-vis Wellington.

I was at one time concerned about the reverberation of the New Zealand action on our allies and our other interests. I think what we have done has been pretty well dictated by the New Zealand actions. We have reacted to the new circumstances. It is not our doing. Alliance parameters have been changed by the New Zealand action.

We are not trying to penalize New Zealand in any sense, but we are trying to adjust to the new circumstances. The door is left open if New Zealand wishes to rescind their position and come back.

I do not foresee any change in the immediate future, but I do get many indications that the people of New Zealand as well as the government officials, as the result of the current dialog, are developing a much better understanding of their place in the South Pacific as well as in the free world.

We see more and more evidence that the New Zealand people are committed to rethinking the problem. Is this the kind of role we want to play? Do we want to remove ourselves from the free world? Do we want to be a part or not be a part of the general deterrent strategy?

Those kinds of things move slowly and I do not anticipate any change in the near term.

There is one cloud on the horizon. The labor government has threatened to introduce legislation to formalize the ban on nuclear-capable warships. I think this is a serious development. If it takes place, it will be necessary for us to respond in some fashion.

Clearly, Japan should spend more money on defense. Japan is certainly capable of spending more money. It is a political decision. In my own way and at every opportunity I urge them to do so. We do not tell Japan what to do to defend itself or how to defend itself. We encourage Japan to build a viable defense.

They have done some things in the past that are very laudable. They have built respectable air defenses. They have a very fine Navy. They are working to fulfill the objectives which their Gov-

ernment has set to protect their sealines out to 1,000 miles. They do not have that capability as yet.

They are very thin in sustainability. Their army needs more investment. They need more viable logistics. I think that the consensus in Japan is moving toward spending more. Certainly Prime Minister Nakasone is leading this movement. They are doing things in Japan now I would not have predicted possible 10 years ago.

They have progressed in terms of dialog, in terms of dealing with the military question, in terms of recognizing the increasing military threat, and increasing Soviet presence.

They will not move as fast as we prefer. They are a consensus society. They are building that consensus. I am optimistic that the Japanese will spend more, will ultimately build a better defense. We must be persistent and patient.

Senator COHEN. What do you see taking place in Korea in terms of the signals coming from the north and the south?

Admiral CROWE. They are mixed, of course. I am optimistic and pessimistic. On the one hand, we have seen some political gestures that are encouraging. We are exploring the advantages and disadvantages.

United States policy encourages the Government of South Korea to do that, and they are. They have had the first meeting of the parliamentarians. They are also having a Red Cross meeting. These are positive signs, as is the dialog on the Olympics.

At the same time there have been some military moves that do not suggest relaxation or a change in their aims. These moves are in the area of better preparedness to fight. We don't have all the information we would like, but we have to stay on the alert.

They have a long track record of holding out the olive branch in one hand and violence in the other. We have to persevere and keep up our guard.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to Admiral Crowe.

I am delighted, as all my colleagues are, with your appointment and I want to join in congratulations and welcome your family who are with you this morning.

A number of my colleagues have already asked you about the winds of reform and reorganization which seem to be blowing relative to the Joint Chiefs, their role in the chain of command, if any, the unification issue, the question of the CINC's and their authority, which you have already addressed this morning.

I want to just ask you a question or two on that before I change the subject, this chain of command from the President down to the Unified Command.

Who was your commander as CINC? Whom did you consider your commander to be?

Admiral CROWE. I report directly to the Secretary of Defense. He has delegated the strategic direction of operations conducted by unified commanders to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the every day course of business, I would contact the Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Would you be open to modification of law which would actually make the Chairman the commander of the CINC's by authority of the Secretary of Defense with that authority?

Admiral CROWE. I would prefer to defer until I have had some experience there and I have been the Chairman awhile. I know in the course of the last few years the Chiefs themselves in conjunction with General Vessey have done a very thorough review of their own responsibilities and looked at the functioning lines of authority and how to improve business.

They have not come to that conclusion. I was not privy to those discussions and the merits and demerits of it. As I said earlier, I have an open mind. I do not come with a preconceived opinion.

Senator LEVIN. That is helpful.

Admiral CROWE. I would hope that I would consult with this committee as you go forward on the subject.

Senator LEVIN. You talked about some of the trends in the Pacific. As I understand your testimony here this morning, you have indicated that neither side can be confident of prevailing. I presume in a conventional conflict that you referred to, but I do not want to put words in your mouth——

Admiral CROWE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN [continuing]. You indicated, I believe, that the trends were favorable in our direction.

Is that a correct understanding of your testimony?

Admiral CROWE. I would certainly say in a macro sense they are, Senator, because I think in that particular region of the world in terms of politics, in terms of economics, in terms of allies, in terms of stability and peace, we are doing well.

Anyplace you have the affluence that we have in the Far East you have stability and political maturity on the increase. All these things we have in the Far East. Those, of course, are U.S. policy. That is what we want. Militarily is another question.

Senator LEVIN. You indicated, as I understood your testimony, that even militarily the trends were favorable recently.

Admiral CROWE. I feel much better about the posture of our forces than I did when I came to CINCPAC.

Senator LEVIN. Can you say the trends are favorable now in the military in the Pacific?

Admiral CROWE. Certainly you can say that our position has improved tremendously. When you say the trends, you have just decided, and the Congress, to go to a zero base and only increase appropriations to accommodate inflation. That is going to have an impact on my posture.

For example, my munitions sustainability curve is on the uptrend. We don't have everything we want. I was hoping we would see deficiencies corrected in 1988 or 1989. That will not be true now. We will have to draw out those deficiencies.

When you do that, that does not mean that you are just taking longer to get where you want to go. It means in those years you have less capability. That will be true across the board, modernization, weapon systems, et cetera.

Senator LEVIN. Are you able to make any statements at all about the relative trends now in the Pacific, militarily?

Admiral CROWE. I will say I have been encouraged by the trends in the last few years. If they had continued with the present full program implemented, I would feel very encouraged. Now I would have to reassess it.

Senator LEVIN. The trends and the balance in other areas you want to withhold judgment on?

Admiral CROWE. I would prefer to do that.

Senator LEVIN. The ABM Treaty is the next question I would like to ask you about, the action of the National Security Council relative thereto. If you are able to continue on this, fine; if not, I can understand.

The ABM Treaty requires that each party undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea based, air based, mobile land based. The National Security Council has recently in its unclassified description of the SDI Program said the following:

"That we intend to adhere strictly to ABM Treaty limitations. We will insist that the Soviets do so as well."

Does the statement that we intend to adhere strictly to the ABM Treaty limitations reflect your own instincts relative to the ABM Treaty and its relationship to SDI?

Admiral CROWE. Certainly at this juncture, Senator, what the President contemplates does not violate the treaty.

Senator LEVIN. So, that statement about strict adherence also reflects your own instinct?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, it does. I am told now the Soviets are engaged in rather heavy ABM research.

Senator LEVIN. They are indeed.

Admiral, about 52 of us in the Senate a few years ago signed a letter which Senator Nunn and I circulated relative to mutual exchange visits of higher level military personnel between ourselves and the Soviet Union, encouraging the President to offer to have such mutual visits of our people with the Soviets, and indeed I think the President last year at the United Nations made reference to such a mutual visit program.

In this authorization bill we have now placed some funds for travel for such visits.

My question is: Would you consider such a mutual visitation program to be beneficial?

Admiral CROWE. Yes, sir, I would.

Senator LEVIN. My last question relates to an interview you recently had with the Washington Post. Beware of those Moors as time goes on in any event.

Admiral CROWE. I have already done that. I have seen a lot of interesting information about myself in the newspapers.

Senator LEVIN. They generally do pretty well, as a matter of fact.

I want to ask you about the comment which you made about the number of nuclear warheads. I don't have the article in front of me, but this is how I remember the quote to be, that you saw no reason to increase the number of nuclear warheads, but felt we should continue to modernize the delivery system to meet the Soviet threat.

I wonder if you would give us your reasoning on that?

Admiral CROWE. I am surprised if I said or I made the statement that we should just modernize the delivery systems. I am in favor of modernizing the deterrent in the overall sense.

I think we have had some research that allowed us to build better weapons as well and in most cases smaller weapons. As I understand it, we have considerably reduced our weapon inventory in the last few years. This has largely been made possible by modernization of some of our systems.

My statement would refer to the entire spectrum as well as offensive measures, passive measures, penetration aids, warning, communications, particularly C-3; a more invulnerable, more stable communications system. That is what I was referring to.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Admiral Crowe. I, too, want to congratulate you on your appointment. I know you will live up to everyone's expectations and accolades that have been passed around here this morning and you will perform your responsibilities and duties in magnificent fashion.

I have questions concerning the area of arms control and specifically the alleged violations that have gone on in this area.

On both sides of the aisle there has been a lot of concern expressed about the violations of the arms control treaties. We have requested analysis of what the military implications would be of these violations.

I wonder if you might share with us your thoughts about the military implications of arms control violations and what your thinking might be on this problem.

Admiral CROWE. First of all, Senator, I know of no senior military officer who does not heartily endorse the arms control effort we are currently engaged in. It is certainly part of our own strategy and Defense Department policy. I applaud it. I intend to support it in every way I can.

For those treaties to be effective, they have to be adhered to by both sides. When we are making decisions such as should we extend SALT II, how we will negotiate, and so forth, I think the violations question is a very important part of that.

We should monitor violations because in the end the success of the treaty will depend directly on whether both sides adhere to the treaty. There is, as I understand, a U.S. Government study currently under way at the direction of the President to look at these violations in a more thoughtful and deeper way and it is due out at the end of this year.

I don't think it would be appropriate for me to try to predict what that study will conclude.

Senator QUAYLE. I don't want to get into the area of trying to prejudge what that report is going to be. Let me just try to underline my concern and other people's concerns that the Soviets have violated existing agreements.

You said that it is a very important part of the process of going forward. You also mentioned you don't know of any military people who don't support the arms control process.

That is fine. I accept that. I also want to emphasize that as these violations are pointed out, that in the past we have talked about them, but we really have not gotten down to see if in fact there are military implications.

I would assume if there are violations of the treaties, that they would have adverse military implications for the United States.

Admiral CROWE. Certainly in some cases and maybe in most.

Senator QUAYLE. Therefore, I encourage you as the new Chairman of the JCS to really pay a great deal of attention to this report that will be coming out. If we just talk about it and don't sit down and try to figure out what our military response will be and what we are going to do about it, you are probably doing a disservice to the arms control process itself. If there are violations and they keep going on, what is the use of having the process anyway?

We have to nail this thing down and be a little bit more precise than we have been in the past. We talk about violations. I think it is now time to really put some meaning and substance behind what these violations mean.

As one member of the committee, I implore you to take this very, very seriously. It is a bipartisan concern expressed on both sides of the aisle and we need analysis of what these violations mean to our national security.

Admiral CROWE. I think the military impact is well within our charge.

Senator QUAYLE. I think it is, too.

Admiral, I wonder if you might be able to share with us your ideas and philosophy concerning the strategic defense initiative and how this relates to our whole national security policy.

I would like to know what kind of priority you think it ought to have or what kind of emphasis you might place on it.

Admiral CROWE. Senator, let me say at the outset that as a military man, anytime somebody says to me that they have an idea or scheme that may give us an opportunity to do something without using nuclear weapons, I am going to listen very closely. I am going to have a very receptive mind if a practical scheme can be worked out and translated into reality.

It seems to me a great deal has been written about the SDI, not all of it positive. Certainly at this point or at this juncture it is a proposal to do research. That is what it is. It is a proposal to see if this idea is a practical one that can be translated into military hardware and do what some of its proponents claim. I certainly support that view.

I have seen some of the complaints about SDI. I think I understand them. I am not so sure I find them persuasive. It is a scheme that offers us a more stable deterrent. Please understand, it is often overlooked that no one is saying that it is definitely a viable and workable proposition.

They are saying let's find out and see if we can realize the promise laid out by its proponents. If it is there and it works, it is a way to increase our deterrence without nuclear weapons, it is a way to erode the confidence of the Soviets in their ability to mount a nuclear strike.

I find these are all pluses.

Senator QUAYLE. I detect, and tell me if I am wrong, I detect by your emphasis on trying to determine if this technology can work, that your emphasis perhaps might be on the near term applications of SDI rather than the long term.

In other words, what we might be able to deploy on a workable basis within the next 8 to 10 years rather than placing a lot of emphasis on the so-called astrodome concept where we are going to make a big shield for the United States.

I sense by your emphasis on what is going to be workable and translating that into reality, that we ought to get on with the show, get on with the business to see whether that might work, and, therefore, this leads me to believe you might be willing to emphasize the near term application of SDI technology.

Admiral CROWE. I don't know that I thought about it in those terms.

Senator QUAYLE. You are not talking in those terms?

Admiral CROWE. Not in the long and short. I must admit I have a lot of confidence in American technology if we put our minds to it. Many people say it is not possible, it is not a workable scheme. That people have that lack of confidence is sort of amazing because in my lifetime in the military I have seen some things come into being that people said would be impossible.

Senator QUAYLE. And to overcome that, the best way for us to do is to proceed with research and development, but also define on what can be deployed in the next 8 to 10 years.

Admiral CROWE. I would concur with you.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I would not want to indicate any prejudice or bias as a member of this committee, but what other qualifications you may bring to this job, that you will move into your stature, has been definitely enhanced today by the fact that you brought two marines alone with you.

I know we don't question the families, Mr. Chairman. I think sometimes we would be better served at some of these confirmation hearings if we had the family on and questioned them about the qualifications. We won't call Shirley or Blake to the stand today, but if you have their recommendations, you can't be all bad, Admiral. You have my vote if you have theirs.

Admiral CROWE. I am not sure I can handle two marines in one family. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Getting back to the organization of the Pentagon, we want combat efficiency and the Pentagon exists to try to make that possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is at the peak of that. Once a decision is made to do something, it is up to the JCS and you in particular as the new head of the JCS to carry that out.

How does it work in war?

The buck stops at JCS at that point once the order has been given. You will be at the apex of that thing.

I, frankly, have not made up my mind yet where I stand on the purple suit concept, the idea that we can have people, once they move into the status you are going to move into, they forswear their former allegiance, if you will, in your case to the Navy, and

you become what somebody has termed a purple suiter, you take on a new loyalty to the country as a whole and not your previous service.

Some of the functions in the Pentagon in the recent past have not given us much good feeling about the ability to take care of that.

Senator Cohen mentioned Grenada. We understand a lot of bickering went on back and forth, who was going to have what part of that. We moved into Grenada with all the might of the United States and it took 2 weeks to overcome several hundred Cuban Seabees.

That does not give us any confidence in being able to handle a bigger operation if that kind of bickering is to result from that kind of comparatively small action like Grenada.

I guess my question is: What are your views on the whole purple suit concept? Do you think we need to move toward that? Do you think the Joint Chiefs are organized properly to do the job?

If not, where have we gone wrong?

It may be too soon for you to make these decisions, but I would hope you might be able to give us some of your thoughts on reorganization of the Joint Chiefs or at the top Pentagon structure that you think will enhance your ability to do the job because that is what we are talking about.

We can't do this in the abstract because it is combat efficiency, whether we are organized at the top to really conduct combat, determining where people are getting killed.

Unless we are organized properly, then we won't do the best job and have the best combat efficiency. It will be largely your decisionmaking that will make that work or not work.

How do you want to be reorganized?

Admiral CROWE. First of all, Senator, I am not familiar with the machinations that went on behind the scenes on Grenada or some of the other instances you cite and whether interservice rivalry was a problem. If it was, I am not sure exactly what scheme or reorganization I would recommend to overcome those problems.

I read a recent book where the author came out with the conclusion we should go into a completely unified setup at senior levels.

I have a deep respect for my own service. I have been in the Navy a long time. But, I think if someone asked me at this juncture what was the proudest achievement of my career, I would say it has been the fact for the past 5 years I have commanded men and women of all services, both 3 years in southern Europe and the Mediterranean and 2 years as unified commander in the Pacific. These kinds of problems come up constantly, I know from personal experience, and there are instances where the services push their own involvement, their own contribution.

In a certain sense it is healthy. You want people to be eager, you want them to contribute. The services do give our men loyalty—they give them esprit. On the other hand, you don't want the desire for public affairs and service interest to get in the way of organizing in the best fashion whatever the forces necessary to achieve your mission.

That is the job of the unified commander. He has to shove aside those kinds of concerns and say what is the best way to put this

thing together to get it done efficiently and with the least effort and with the least loss of life. It doesn't matter who is going to get the most headlines.

Now, that is difficult. That is not easy to do, given our lifetime of involvement, as you well know from your own service. But that is the responsibility of the guy who is in that position of responsibility, whether it is the unified commander or JCS.

I subscribe to that philosophy. I intend to transfer it to the JCS, at least where I am involved. The JCS is a larger game, I admit that but the principle remains. That is the way I look at it. I think that is the way to go. It is imperative that it be done that way.

Senator GLENN. The next question will be whether you are in favor of changing the wiring diagrams of the organizational charts over there at this point?

I think your answer is that you would rather look at that before you make any suggestions. I don't blame you for that.

Another area we have wrestled with on the committee during our markup of the Defense authorization bill involved what sort of strength and what kind of manning we have in the Reserves and National Guard, and so on.

If we went into a real big combat operation, obviously, we would be activating the Reserves, calling them to active duty. In times past, way back, at least in my own experience, the Reserves were never looked at as having an immediate combat capability and we always rather hated to have to work with the Reserves back in some of those days. This is long past.

I am not talking about Reserves now. Back in those days, at least, they were not as well trained. Yet today we are really depending on the Reserves to a tremendous extent. We even have full-time manning now in some of the Reserve units. We have Reserves on full-time duty, but, in effect, staying at home, yet getting the benefits, the same as if they were on active duty all the time. They never have to leave home theoretically unless there is a national emergency of some kind or other.

I guess I would ask you your opinion of some of these things, about how much dependence we can have on the Reserve units, what your experience has been in the Pacific area. We have worked much with them because we are going into much bigger dependence on Reserves than we ever have previously in case of big scale military activitiy.

How do you see the Reserves and National Guard getting into this?

Admiral CROWE. Clearly we are putting more and more reliance on Reserves, Senator, as you pointed out. In the Pacific this is particularly true in the Air Force in the lift capability of some Reserve squadrons.

As a matter of fact, in Hawaii, our air defense is primarily furnished by our Air National Guard which flies all the time and is very, very capable. I do not have as much experience concerning the Army as I do not have that large an Army present in the Pacific. We have the 2d Division in Korea and 25th Division at Schofield Barracks.

The problem of ground Reserves, except in the defense of Alaska, does not figure predominately in the calculation. The trick, as I see

it and I think other military commanders in the Pacific will share this, is to isolate and determine those functions that Reserves can perform at a high level of capability without degrading our everyday response posture.

For example, our forward deployed posture in the western Pacific by definition cannot rely on Reserve components, at least not heavily, except maybe for auxiliary functions and some of the support functions.

On the other hand, when you are responding to a major crisis where you have the time and willingness to bring in other units, I think they can do very well.

The question, of course, is to determine which functions lend themselves to that and which do not. I think the danger is that once you discover that Reserves can do some things and do them well as in the air business where the airline pilots often have more time in the air than the active people, once you can see they can perform these functions well, there is a dangerous tendency to say let them do everything.

We have to guard against that.

Senator GLENN. Just one more question.

I talked to one of the people aboard one of our major carriers a short time ago. They said this cross-decking of critical weapons, and so on, particularly air-to-air weapons and air-to-ground weapons, they felt had improved considerably.

This was a major concern of mine when I first came on the committee at the beginning of this year, the fact we spend billions and billions for all these weapon systems, whether it be for submarines, or something else, and then don't supply a decent number of weapons so they can go to war and use them.

They are just out there as transports for people with little or no combat capability unless we have munitions to back up the facilities and put on the weapon systems, whatever it is.

I just ask you to comment very briefly, because my time is up, on whether that cross-decking situation and your munitions supply is actually improving now and is in a reasonable state now and how much more improvement it needs.

Admiral CROWE. That has been my No. 1 priority. For 2 years it has improved markedly and substantially. If we continue our programs, that problem is going to disappear in a year or two.

I am not sure what the decrease in appropriations will do to draw it out.

Senator GLENN. You have had a lot of experience in submarines. It seems impossible to believe that we have spent billions on submarines of all kinds and then we were down to—the releasable figure is under two loads of torpedoes per submarine. I would add only, well under two.

In other words, if we sent them out and they fired all their torpedoes, we wouldn't have any more except for a partial second load.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman, I do have to leave. You have my proxy to vote in favor of Admiral Crowe.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Gramm?

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, let me first say that I am delighted with your appointment. As far as I am aware, you are not only the first Ph.D. to ever hold this office as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in looking at your background, it is probably as broad and varied as anybody who has ever held this position.

As you know from all the questions you have already been asked, we are engaged on this committee, a subpanel of it, in a debate about reorganization of the Joint Chiefs and the Pentagon and Unified Commands. So, there certainly will be a period when the Joint Chiefs will need strong leadership and where we will need a lot of guidance in looking at these areas once you are in your post and have accumulated experience there.

I would like to begin by saying I strongly support your appointment. I intend to vote for it and to be active in support of it.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you, Senator. I thought you were going to accuse me of being the first Oklahoman.

Senator GRAMM. I admit that bothers me a little. But Will Rogers did come out of Oklahoma. I often ask my colleagues from Oklahoma what they would have done, had it not been for Will Rogers. But now they will have you. [Laughter.]

Admiral CROWE. They say who wins the Oklahoma/Texas football games is not a matter of life and death; it is much more important than that.

Senator GRAMM. You see, Admiral, I am an Aggie.

In any case, I welcome your statement which I missed since I was at another meeting about more influence on the budget.

I would like to give you a quick summary while I have you here as a captive audience and then ask you a question relating to a problem in the budget.

Historically the Pentagon has been very loath to set up priorities as they relate to budget factors. We have normally gotten a request for weapon systems. We have gotten a request through the budget proposal, but we are continually bombarded by various sub-groups and individuals and various service secretaries who request certain weapon systems and have often no specification as to priorities.

I just had my first conference committee on armed services with the House. I am still suffering from mental gap from this pork orgy we went through in fighting off all these add-ons the House had and each one of them had some request from somebody in the military for all these weapon systems.

One of the biggest problems we had is that historically in the preparation of the budget the Pentagon has been loath to take into account the constraints that are imposed and set up a ranking system so that we can gauge how important a weapon is.

For example, in our conference we ended up in a debate between buying more C–130's for the National Guard versus providing a platform for sending a signal to our missile submarine force that a war is on.

I was wondering going in, and I know you are heading for the job and as a result have not acquired experience in it, if you have any ideas about how we can do a better job in relation to a communication from the Joint Chiefs to the Congress about what the real priorities are, given that we have a very limited amount of money?

Admiral CROWE. I don't have any specific ideas right off, Senator. Obviously, there are many people concerned about the question asked, not only in the Congress, but in the Pentagon itself.

The JCS certainly will be grappling with this problem of how to have more influence on this priority problem and how to assess what is going on. Please understand this concerns more than the military. We are talking about an issue with high political content, the civilian staff as well as other parts of the executive branch that deal with fiscal matters, et cetera.

We would only be one small part of the puzzle. There are, obviously, some studies going on now in the procurement, in the acquisition process as well as procurement abuse. I think there is a concentrated effort to improve the system and the JCS will be participating in many of those efforts.

Senator GRAMM. Let me say you will always have Members of Congress who will say the Pentagon says we no longer need the flintlocks, but it is built in my district, I know it well. After all, they didn't say they needed this, that and the other, and, therefore, we ought to fund it. Unfortunately, in many cases they prevail.

I think the better job that the Pentagon can do in setting up priorities as to the relative importance of various weapon systems, the better job we will be able to do in fighting off the pork barrel politics associated with every element of the Federal budget.

Unfortunately, at a time when we face a dual crisis, we face a Soviet threat and deficit threat, we have to find some way to lessen the pork barrel politics as it relates to defense procurement and clearly the better job the Pentagon can do in giving relative weighting, the better off we will be.

Admiral CROWE. The military commanders want to get more for their money and they want to get the best systems they can get.

Senator GRAMM. As I said earlier, one of the areas we are looking at is defense reorganization, again trying to be sure we have the best organizational system we can develop, given the $302 billion investment that we just made last week through our Defense Authorization Conference.

One of the areas that we have discussed and held some meetings on, relates to the Unified Command.

I want to ask a question in a generic sense, not as it relates to your leadership there.

Did you find that when you took over the Unified Command in the Pacific that there was a problem in terms of the existence of a Unified Command?

Is there a tendency when you have a commander from one branch commanding all branches, for individual branches to have at least informal lines of communication directly to their service chiefs?

Is there any type of reform that you can envision that would help us assure that the unified commander is in fact the commander and he has the full authority that he needs in order to carry out the mission there?

Admiral CROWE. To begin with, component commanders do not have informal lines to the chief of the service; they have formal lines because the services are charged with the responsibility for logistics support, training, for readiness, not for operations, not for

strategy, but for those support functions, discipline, personnel, hospital, et cetera, et cetera.

There is a heavy load of business going on between each service's component in the Pacific Command and the parent service back here.

I would be misleading you if I told you that this did not affect the unified commander's ability to carry out his job; it does.

It is equally true that component commanders sometimes use those channels to get their voice in the process to get what they want. That is not unique to the service. It is the Unified Command setup. It is anywhere you talk about power.

That is one of the problems in reorganization, that is, the distribution of power. That provokes opposition, et cetera. The biggest problem a unified commander has is to impose his authority over a very large amorphous structure.

Those channels are alive with communications, they are there for a reason. The unified commander does not want to have to deal with all the logistics problems, all the disciplinary problems, all the personnel problems.

Those lines are not there to harm or injure him. They are there for good and sufficient reason. They do, however, pose a problem for the unified commander.

We mentioned earlier in some of our conversation as well as the answers I gave to congressional queries on reorganization that I wanted to strengthen the dialog between the Chief of Service and the unified commander. He would not necessarily have to go through the components allowing a greater say in those decisions that impact on his strategy and operations.

This can be done without change of law. This can be done within the services. We are looking at that.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Denton?

Senator DENTON. I just want to express my personal and professional delight, Mr. Chairman, that the President has nominated Admiral Crowe to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I have known Bill for more than 40 years. He was a classmate at the Naval Academy. He is one of only two of our class still on active duty. Those who know him best have the strongest belief that it is fitting that he fill our Nation's top military position.

In digression, sir, one of his children is to be married next Saturday here.

Admiral CROWE. They are right behind me, Senator.

Senator DENTON. This is the first time he has finagled an appointment such as this just to attend the wedding of one of his children. I congratulate you for that, Bill.

I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that it has already been pointed out that he not only has a degree from the Naval Academy, but an MS degree from Stanford, and a Ph.D. from Princeton in international affairs.

I doubt that any Chairman previously has had that kind of educational qualification. I just want to note that, and that he knows German and French.

Admiral CROWE. I wish to correct the record. I don't really. One newspaper said I was fluent in two languages, the next week I was fluent in three. Next week I may be fluent in four.

Senator DENTON. I never change it when they say that I know Russian. The only thing they do wrong, they are never right about my grandchildren. They say there are five and then there are six. I say no, there are seven. [Laughter.]

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to welcome this gentleman back to Washington, and to praise him for the service to our country that he has already rendered and for the service he will be permitted, I hope, to render as a result of this nomination.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much.

I have one question, Admiral, that we always ask on behalf of the minority leader of the Senate, Senator Byrd.

Admiral, if confirmed, do you agree to appear before this and other appropriate committees and give us your candid views and answer all appropriate questions relative to your position?

Admiral CROWE. I agree, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Do you have any more questions, Sam.

Senator NUNN. No, Mr. Chairman.

I look forward to working with Admiral Crowe. I think he will do an excellent job in a very important position.

As I told him privately, I believe that his job is going to be probably the most difficult of any Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in peacetime because we are no longer in an era of 5 percent growth and it is not nearly as easy to please everybody around the table if you are dividing zero growth as it is when you are splitting up 5 to 8 percent growth.

In addition, we have the difficult job of reorganization and I hope and expect the admiral to take a very vigorous load in that after he has had a chance to assess the situation as it now exists.

We have challenges all over the world. He has his hands full, but I am sure, as I said before, he is the right man at the right place at the right time for this job.

I enthusiastically support his nomination.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Jim, do you have any other questions?

Senator EXON. Two quick questions, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, we learn a lot from these hearings. One of the things I learned this morning is that you were from Oklahoma. I did not know that previously. I heard the by-play regarding football in Oklahoma and Texas.

I would like to ask you a big league question on football.

How would you stand in a contest between Nebraska and Oklahoma? [Laughter.]

Admiral CROWE. That is pretty easy, Senator, but I had better be careful.

Senator EXON. If that is the only thing we disagree on, we are going to get along fine.

Seriously, let me ask you this question which keeps coming up all the time. I think it is important that we recognize the challenges that we have with the Soviet Union; at the same time I

think it is important that we recognize the significant military strength that we have.

I am going to phrase my question this way: In the event of a global conventional conflict, say in the next 5 years, between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies, and given the disparity in their mission, excluding for the moment the other military forces, which side's naval forces do you feel would prevail in such a conflict?

Admiral CROWE. Please bear in mind that my answer is not fully unbiased, but conditioned by an awful lot of experience in the U.S. Navy.

Wellington said after Waterloo, it was a near thing.

I conclude we would prevail. We would have losses that would be traumatic. My own personal view is that the main reason that we would ultimately prevail is our people. We have better people than they do.

In fact, we have the best young men and women I have seen in 40 years of service. They are better educated, they are more imaginative, willing and able to operate on their own. They are certainly enthusiastic, loyal and as brave as their predecessors.

I might divert for a moment and say the greatest reward for a career in the service is the opportunities to associate day in and day out with young American men and women. In my view, the country's future is in good hands. They are absolutely terrific. That is our ace in the hole. That is what is going to save us finally.

Senator EXON. Do you agree with the statement I made in a recent talk to the American Legion State Convention in Nebraska that the personnel we currently have in our Armed Forces are by far the best today than they have ever been, better even than the forces we assembled in previous conflicts?

Do you agree with that?

Admiral CROWE. I agree wholeheartedly with that. I agree with it across the board in all services.

Senator EXON. One last question, Mr. Chairman.

Since I assume, Admiral, that you endorse the strategic triad concept, cannot the triad still be effective if one leg is somewhat shorter or one leg somewhat longer than the others?

My point is that we sometimes get involved in interservice rivalry, to make the balance between the components of the triad equal.

I suspect that it may be fine from time to time to have a very strong triad in which the three legs might not be exactly equal.

Admiral CROWE. Of course, that was the original rationale for the triad, and if technological developments eroded one leg, the other two would be strong. In a sense, that is the way we have used it.

You attempt then to restore balance. Maybe technology will tilt the other way. You update and modernize. I would not suggest they all have to be at the same strength at the same time. I think it would be dangerous to let one atrophy.

Senator EXON. In other words, it would be dangerous if one was in danger of collapsing?

Admiral CROWE. Yes. But the three legs do strengthen our overall long-term prospects. We should constantly be aware of what is happening to any leg of the triad.

Senator EXON. I would just warn you, Admiral, that I think you are going to find, as we find here from time to time, that as you assume your new very important duties, you may run into some of the same difficulties that we do here with interservice rivalry, this rivalry may be good to an extent, but sometimes when we have finite resources, we have to make sacrifices. We want to work with you in making prioritization decisions among the various components of our Armed Forces for the overall good of the defense posture of the United States.

Thank you very much for your testimony. I look forward enthusiastically to your assuming your new position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Admiral, it has been a real pleasure having you here. That pleasure has been enhanced by your very attractive wife whom I have not seen for some time and by your family, particularly your Marine pilot son. He showed very good judgment in not going into submarines. [Laughter.]

Without objection, we will report the Admiral's name to the floor and the staff will poll those members not here.

The best of luck to you.

Admiral CROWE. Thank you so much.

[Questions for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

PACIFIC REGION

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Crowe, do you feel that the Congress focuses enough attention on the Pacific region compared to our emphasis on NATO?

Admiral CROWE. Historically, the United States has looked toward Europe both militarily and economically. The importance of Europe and the NATO alliance has certainly not appreciably decreased over the years; however, the rapid emergence of the Pacific in U.S. strategic thinking cannot be overlooked or underemphasized.

Over the past ten to fifteen years the countries of Asia have developed economically to the point where we now do a greater volume of trade across the Pacific than across the Atlantic. The benefits of protecting and supporting these emerging nations are evident.

At the same time, the Soviets have continued to build both their naval and air forces in the Pacific to the point where they could upset the balance of power and pose a major threat in any global or regional conflict. The U.S. interests in the Pacific theater should be acknowledged and the necessary steps to insure a continued powerful U.S. presence in the area should be supported.

INSURGENCY PROBLEM

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, wars of so-called "national liberation" are spreading around the world. Most notable perhaps is the growing insurgency problem in the Philippines. What advice can you give Congress for dealing with such conflicts?

Admiral CROWE. The most distressing aspect of the insurgency problem within the Philippines is its rate of growth. We have seen it increase in an alarming fashion over the last year and a half, and I do not think this is related so much to the appeal of communism as to some of the other social and economical problems which plague the country. Abusive practices such as corruption and maladministration tend to drive people to seek other solutions. If the insurgency continues to grow at its current rate, it could become a definite threat to the order of that republic.

However, I do not see the insurgency overthrowing the government in the Philippines. I believe the elements of opposition to the current government are attempting to influence events in the Philippines through a democratic process. Most of these elements are pro-American and would not want to see our facilities closed or our access be denied. It is imperative we recognize this situation and seek ways to assist the Philippine poeple in resolving their difficulties.

TERRORISM

Senator THURMOND. One of the most serious problems we face today is responding to acts of terrorism. There is a great deal of debate about whether or not the United States should take military action in response to terrorist activity. Would you give us your views on the use of military force in preemptive and retaliatory roles for dealing with terrorists?

Admiral CROWE. I don't think I can give you a direct reply. It's a hypothetical situation and I really shouldn't give a hypothetical response. It would really depend on the specific circumstances at the time. However, in using force in a terrorist situation, my view would be to project ahead to determine whether force would produce the results desired. If so, I think the use of force would be justified.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE WILSON

STRATEGIC VERSUS CONVENTIONAL RESOURCES

Senator WILSON. Admiral Crowe, as former "Nuclear CINC" and now our new Chairman, could you comment on the charge that we currently place too much emphasis on strategic resources as compared with conventional resources? How long do you see the current balance holding?

Admiral CROWE. For some time now, our major emphasis has been focused on conventional force modernization. This has been necessary due to the growth in Soviet military power and in particular, our decreasing ability to resist conventional aggression. As an operational commander who faces real day-to-day problems and is concerned with our immediate war fighting capabilities, I strongly support this modernization effort. More importantly, providing the U.S. with a credible conventional deterrent serves to lower the nuclear threshold.

This emphasis on conventional forces is not and should not detract from our ongoing strategic modernization effort. Having allowed our strategic balance to deteriorate, we have embarked on what I consider to be an appropriate program for modernizing these forces. When completed, this program should achieve the desired strategic balance.

The major challenge we face is to balance properly the simultaneous modernization of both conventional and nuclear forces. The Soviets continue to modernize with several new generations of ICBMs, SLBMs and fighter and bomber aircraft. The current balance of resources apportionment should be continued into the foreseeable future unless there is a major breakthrough in the arms control talks or a dramatic reduction in the number of trouble spots requiring our attention around the world.

STRATEGIC BALANCE

Senator WILSON. A new Congressional Research Service report on the Strategic Balance claims that we have lost ground vis-a-vis the Soviets. It states that while we've modernized, they have modernized faster! Could you comment on this and what steps would you recommend to remedy this?

Admiral CROWE. In recent years, the Soviets have indeed modernized faster in absolute terms than we have because they started from an inferior position. During the 1970's the Soviets invested some $300 billion more in arms than we did. Consider that our newest B-52 bomber was built in 1962 and our last Minuteman III ICBM was fielded in 1975. During the same period, the Soviets have fielded several new missile and bomber systems and greatly expanded their blue water navy, both in surface and submarine forces.

Since the early 1980's, our increased defense efforts have begun to redress the neglect that our forces suffered during the 1970's. The remedy to the problem is built around our long range Comprehensive Strategic Modernization Program, which is in the process of upgrading our offensive forces (B1, Peacekeeper, Cruise Missiles, Advanced Trident) and defensive forces (AWACS, F-15s, Air Defense Radars).

Until the Soviets show a willingness to slow or halt their arms buildup, we need to continue to modernize our forces.

Chairman GOLDWATER. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the committee proceeded to other business.]

[The nomination of William J. Crowe, Jr., was reported to the Senate by Senator Goldwater on July 30, 1985, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 31, 1985.]

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